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Kong 
Abstract 
In 1997 the government of Hong Kong reformed its policy on the language medium for teaching at 
the secondary-school level and removed schools’ right to choose their own medium. Among the 404 
public and “aided” secondary schools in Hong Kong, the government allowed only 100 to use 
English as the medium for teaching and required the remaining 304 to use the native language, 
Chinese. The authors assess the spatial impact of the policy reform and estimate the bid function for 
English-language schools. The results show that the 1997 policy reform shifted parental preferences 
from public to private education and increased the marginal bid for proximity to private English 
schools by 2 percent. Following the reform, homeowners were willing to pay, on average, HK 
$8,400 for each additional 100 metres closer to a private English school. 
 
I. Introduction 
The present study estimates and applies the bid function to assess the spatial impact of the 1997 
education policy reform in Hong Kong. It examines changes in the marginal bid—the marginal 
willingness to pay or the implicit demand—for proximity to those primary schools that were linked 
to English secondary schools after the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) reformed education policy. Prior to 1997, secondary schools were free to choose their 
language of instruction. In 1997 the SAR government abolished autonomy and restricted to only 100 
secondary schools the use of English as the medium of instruction, forcing the remaining 304 
schools to teach in the mother tongue, Chinese. Although the policy reform targeted secondary 
schools only, it directly influenced primary schools because pupil allocation to secondary schools 
was dependent on the school district in which the primary school was located. 
 The present study focuses on primary schools in Hong Kong before and after the policy 
change. The main hypothesis is that the 1997 policy reform may have increased the demand for 
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private education, especially with regard to those private primary schools that were linked to English 
secondary schools. 
The effect of school quality on house prices has long been generating interest in the housing 
literature. Almost all previous studies agree that good schools are an amenity that is capitalized into 
house prices (Barrow and Rouse, 2004; Black, 1999; Bogard and Cromwell, 2000; Brasington, 1999, 
2000; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004; Colwell and Guntermann, 1984; Haurin and Brasington, 1996; 
Hilber and Mayer, 2004; Jud and Watts, 1981; Weimer and Wolkoff, 2001). Most studies have 
focused on quality of inputs, such as teacher-pupil ratio (Angrist and Lavy, 1999) and state aids 
(Barrow and Rouse, 2004), or outputs, such as test scores (Friesen and Krauth, 2007; Weimer and 
Wolkoff, 2001) and wages (Card, 1995; Card and Krueger, 1996). Almost no studies have 
considered schools’ language of instruction. This omission stems from the fact that all the research 
to date has been conducted in a context where English is the mother tongue and where the choice of 
language of instruction is therefore unnecessary. 
In nations where English is not the mother tongue, schools often face the dilemma of which 
medium of instruction to adopt. Hong Kong is a case in point. On the one hand, proficiency in 
English is perceived as offering a person more career choices and better economic outcomes. On the 
other hand, instruction in the mother tongue may provide a more conducive environment for 
effective learning. This dilemma has been the subject of policy debate since 1842, when Hong Kong 
was colonized. The colonial government adopted a hands-off approach, allowing secondary schools 
to choose their medium of instruction. In 1997 Hong Kong’s sovereignty was returned to the 
Chinese government and the Hong Kong SAR government was established. The SAR government 
revoked the colonial approach and regulated the medium of instruction at the secondary-school level. 
Since the 1997 policy reform, there has been a surge in the number of education studies on 
language choice (Berry and McNeil, 2005; Dimmock and Walker, 1997; Evans, 2000, 2002; Ho and 
Ho, 2004); however, the number of studies that focus on the spatial impact of the reform remains 
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negligible. The reform encouraged parents to choose the language of learning for their children by 
moving close to the primary schools that were linked to English secondary schools and bidding up 
the value of properties located close to these primary schools. The goal of the present study is to 
assess the value of an English school and describe the spatial pattern of the change in property 
values around English schools. 
Two independent random samples of transacted properties are drawn from the database of 
one of the largest local realtors in Hong Kong. The first sample consists of apartments that were sold 
in 1996, prior to the policy reform, and the second sample comprises apartments that were sold in 
2001, four years after the reform. The property price data are geocoded against the street network 
file; they are then matched up with the school profile data and the census socioeconomic profile of 
neighbourhoods. The study first estimates the hedonic regression (the market price) and then the bid 
function (the demand side) for primary schools that are linked to English secondary schools, 
controlling for neighbourhood and school characteristics. The results show that the 1996–2001 
increase in the marginal bid for each 100 metres closer to a primary school approximates HK $8,400 
(approximately US $1,100) if the primary school is private and is linked to an English secondary 
school, compared to the 1996 marginal bid for an average primary school. (Unless otherwise stated, 
all dollar values are based on the 2001 Hong Kong dollar. Note that HK $7.8 is fixed at an exchange 
rate of US $1.0.) 
This paper contributes to the urban housing literature, in at least three ways. First, the study 
relates a region’s language policy to its spatial outcome in the housing market. It reveals the 
important role that geography plays in assessing urban social policies. It shows that policies that are 
intended as aspatial may entail spatial influences, particularly through the housing market. Second, 
the policy reform in Hong Kong provides an interesting context for studying language issues, 
property prices and bids. While there is an increasing number of housing studies that focus on school 
quality (Hilber and Mayer, 2004) and pupils’ education experience (Ledwith, 2009; Sykes and 
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Kuyper, 2009), none of the existing studies focuses on similar language issues as those experienced 
in Hong Kong during the political transition from the British to the Chinese government.1 Most 
studies that examine language and policy deal with immigrants and assimilation processes. Third, 
the 1997 reform presents itself as a natural experiment that allows one to estimate the household bid 
for school quality and the provision of an English-language education. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
education system and language policies of Hong Kong. This is followed by a discussion of the 
analytical framework, estimating strategies, and data and variables. Then the results are summarized 
and a brief conclusion is presented. 
 
II. Background 
2.1 Overview 
Primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong can be categorized in one of three groups, based on 
their source of funding: private, public or government-aided. Private schools are funded by private 
sources. Most private schools in Hong Kong are “international schools,” whose curriculum follows 
that of their home country.2 Public schools are wholly funded and operated by the Hong Kong SAR 
government. Government-aided schools (aided schools, for short) receive subsidies from the 
government while obtaining financial assistance from other sponsors, including religious groups,3 
                                                 
1 Quebec, Canada, encounters a similar language controversy in its school system; however, to the authors’ 
understanding, none of the existing housing studies on Quebec’s language policy and education system attempts to 
estimate Anglophones’ willingness to pay for English education. 
2 The Canadian International School, the California School and the German Swiss International Schools are just a few 
examples. 
3 The main denominational groups that fund schools in Hong Kong are the Anglicans, Catholics and Buddhists. 
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charitable organizations,4 alumni of various educational institutions,5 and trade guilds.6 Both public 
and aided schools follow the curriculum set by the SAR government’s Education Board.7 
One particular group of schools is operated by the English School Foundation (ESF). ESF 
schools are aided schools, serving mainly the children of expatriates. Unlike other aided schools, 
however, ESF schools are allowed to charge incidental and tuition fees to support facilities in 
addition to the instituted curriculum. Because ESF schools differ from most other aided schools, 
both financially and operationally, they are often perceived by Hong Kong residents as private. 
In terms of placements, public and aided schools enrol close to 90 percent of all primary 
school pupils, while private schools enrol 10 percent (Table 1). From the 1960s to the 1990s, the 
number of placements in public primary and secondary schools fell short of demand. As a policy 
response, the government purchased places from aided and private schools under the Bought Place 
Scheme, which in 1991 was replaced by the Direct Subsidy Scheme (DSS). Schools funded under 
the DSS were entitled to receive, from the government, the average unit cost per enrolment, and 
could charge a tuition fee that was no more than one third of the unit cost. They were given the 
autonomy to design their own curriculum, set admission requirements and formulate internal policies. 
Due to a low cap on tuition fees, however, DSS-funded schools were not popular. Appendix 1 
provides a brief overview of the secondary school allocation scheme in Hong Kong. 
 
2.2 Language policy and the policy reform 
                                                 
4 One of the largest charitable organizations that sponsor primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong is Po Leung Kuk. 
5 An example would be Queen’s College Old Boys’ Association. 
6 For example, the Cotton Spinners Association and the Fisheries Joint Association. 
7 Education Department was the agency overlooking education and related matters in Hong Kong under the colonial 
government; it was renamed as Education Bureau under the SAR government. Education Board, however, is the 
advisory board to the government. 
 5
The language of instruction has been a controversy in Hong Kong ever since colonization in 1842.8 
By the early 1940s the controversy had led to an education system split into two streams: the English 
stream, which used English as the medium of instruction (EMI), and the Chinese stream, which used 
Chinese (CMI). Schools in the English stream (English schools, for short) grew at the expense of the 
Chinese stream (Chinese schools), particularly at the secondary level.9 Despite the demand for 
English schools, educators were concerned about the quality of education because, in some English 
secondary schools, pupils’ basic English-language skills were questionable, let alone their ability to 
learn other subjects with English as the language of instruction.10 
In 1990 the government changed the policy direction. The government would guide public 
and aided secondary schools in choosing their medium of instruction and set a timeline for schools to 
switch to the Chinese language. According to the timeline, in 1994–97 the government would start 
advising schools on their appropriate medium of instruction, based on their pupils’ academic 
                                                 
8 The first sign of conflict occurred in the mid-1870s when Governor J.P. Hennessy attempted to impose the use of 
English as the medium of instruction on all schools. This move was opposed by F. Stewart, the Inspector of Government 
Schools, who was of the view that schools over-emphasized English at the expense of the native language, Chinese. 
Discussions on the choice of language led to the 1878 Education Conference, which resulted in the decision to adopt 
English as the medium of instruction at Central School, which had been the first government-run school, opened in 1862. 
The debate continued into the 1900s. The year 1911 saw the opening of the University of Hong Kong, an English-
language institution. During the next three decades enthusiasm for vernacular education increased as the number of 
migrants and refugees from mainland China rose. The heightened enthusiasm not only led to a rise in the number of 
private vernacular schools but also served to turn educators’ attention towards restructuring Hong Kong’s education 
system to meet people’s language needs. In 1935 Edmund Burney, a British Inspector of Schools, proposed that Hong 
Kong’s colonial education be restructured to support mother-tongue teaching. This proposal was strongly opposed by the 
leading aided schools and by parents and was eventually dropped. By the 1950s enrolment in English and Chinese 
secondary schools was almost balanced. In the mid-1960s the government opened the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
which provided Chinese-language tertiary education for pupils graduating from Chinese secondary schools. 
9 By the mid-1980s the vast majority of children in Hong Kong were enrolled in a vernacular school at the primary level 
but in an English school at the secondary level. English secondary schools flourished, for at least two reasons. First, the 
colonial government was instrumental in creating an environment that enhanced the use of English by promoting English 
as the official language. Second, Hong Kong’s rapid economic development as an entrepôt during the 1970s created a 
demand for workers who could communicate in English. In light of the high correlation among economic growth, job 
prospects and proficiency in English, parents perceived English schools as superior institutions and as vehicles for 
upward social mobility. 
10 For example, the 1973 Report of the Board of Education on the Expansion of Secondary School Education in Hong 
Kong in the Next Decade (the Education Green Paper) recommended use of the mother tongue as the medium of 
instruction (Hong Kong Board of Education, 1973). The subsequent White Paper on Education Policy (Hong Kong 
Board of Education, 1974) did not adopt the recommendations contained in the Green Paper and continued to base the 
decision on parental demand and economic factors. In 1982 a panel of overseas educators conducted a comprehensive 
review of education in Hong Kong and recommended (yet again) the use of the mother tongue to deliver education. The 
subsequent Education Commission Report Nos. 1 and 2 (Education Commission 1984, 1986) largely supported the status 
quo and left the decision regarding medium of instruction up to the schools. 
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performance, and by 1998 schools would be “firmly guided” by the government in their choice of 
medium. The timeline received little attention by the media and by the schools themselves until 1997, 
when the SAR government sternly executed its policy reform favouring mother-tongue teaching 
(Education Commission, 2005). In 1997 the government eventually publicly announced the 
education reform and stipulated that each secondary school had to use Chinese (either Cantonese or 
Putonghua) as the medium of instruction unless it applied to the Education Board for an exemption 
and satisfied a set of criteria.11, 12 Non-compliant schools were threatened with sanctions (Hong 
Kong Board of Education, 1997a, 2002).13 Despite the fact that the policy reform started its planning 
in the early 1990s, it was not until 1997 that the policy announcement shocked the schools and the 
parents.  
 
2.4 Immediate reactions by stakeholders 
The 1997 policy reform attracted strong opposition from various stakeholders (Chan, 2002): 
 
                                                 
11 The policy reform was published in the document Guidance on Secondary Schools’ Medium of Instruction. (Hong 
Kong Board of Education, 1997b). 
12 The criteria were: 
1. No less than 85 percent of the pupil intake could belong to Group I and/or Group III in the Medium of 
Instruction Assessment Grouping. The grouping would be based on pupils’ performance in their respective 
grade 5 and 6 internal school assessments in two subjects, Chinese and English. Group I pupils would be those 
within the top 40 percent of Chinese and English as a subject. Group III would be those within the top 40 
percent of one subject and within the top 50 percent of the other subject. 
2. Teachers had to be able to conduct classes in English effectively; the school principal would be responsible for 
certifying teachers’ capabilities. 
3. The school had to have programs and strategies in place to help secondary 1 (grade 7) pupils switch from 
learning in Chinese to learning in English. 
13 Accompanying the new language policy were at least four supplementary initiatives: introduction of Putonghua 
(Mandarin) as a compulsory subject, Chinese and English Extensive Reading Scheme, Native English-Speaking 
Teachers (NET) Scheme and a compulsory language aptitude test for teachers. Of these initiatives, the aptitude test for 
teachers drew the most heated debate in Hong Kong. This was a new benchmark test that arose from Education 
Commission Report No. 6. (Education Commission, 1996) The benchmark test required that all English and Putonghua 
teachers — both new and existing — pass the main components of the Language Proficiency Assessment for Teachers 
(LPAT). It also required that teachers of English as a subject write five papers (on reading, writing, listening, speaking 
and language assessment) and teachers of Putonghua as a subject write four papers (on listening and recognition, pingyin, 
speaking and language assessment). The LPAT included an action plan to raise language standards designed by the 
Standing Committee on Language Education and Research (SCOLAR) in 1996. The action plan stipulated that all 
language teachers joining the profession in 2004–05 hold a Bachelor of Education degree majoring in the relevant 
language or another degree plus a postgraduate diploma in Education majoring in the relevant language. The LPAT and 
the SCOLAR reform invited strong opposition from the Professional Teachers Union (Glenwright, 2005). 
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• Secondary schools opposed the reform because it took away their freedom of 
language choice and affected enrolment. Among the 404 public and aided secondary 
schools, 124 applied for an exemption to remain an English school. Of the 124 
applications, 100 were approved. Of the 24 rejected cases, 20 appealed the decision and 
all publicly declared their anxiety regarding recruitment for the next academic year.14 
 
• Pupils, especially those from the 24 rejected cases, were outraged by the reform. They 
viewed the switch from English to Chinese as a downgrading of their school. To show 
their dissatisfaction, they launched campaigns, held press conferences and sent letters to 
the press.15 
 
• Parents rallied and petitioned the decision of the Education Board. They protested, 
launched letter-writing campaigns and placed an advertisement in the local newspaper.16 
 
• Some groups, such as the Hong Kong Education Policy Concern Organization, urged 
the government to delay the reform for three years until teachers could be properly 
                                                 
14 Jockey Club Ti I Secondary School, one of the 24 rejected schools, revealed to the press that its applications for 
admission dropped from 700 in 1996 to 13 in 1997, upon the announcement of its status change from an English to a 
Chinese school. The principal of another school (Tuen Mun Madam Lau Kam Lung Secondary School) shared the 
concern regarding applications for admission. The rejected schools delivered a petition signed by 1,600 parents and 
1,000 pupils, as well as dozens of letters criticizing the language policy (Chan, 2002). 
15 “We strongly request the continuation of teaching in English,” stated pupils from Pope Paul VI College. “On what 
basis have we been disqualified? We question the vetting criteria! It is insensitive to the wishes of the school, parents and 
pupils!” (Ming Pao Daily News, Dec. 4, 1997). The student union of St. Antonius Girls’ College collected 1,000 
signatures in support of its appeal to the Education Board (Ming Pao Daily News, Dec. 13, 1997). 
16 A group of parents from Salesian English School held a letter-writing campaign to have the decision of the Education 
Board rescinded (Poole, 1997). The alumni of St. Louis School raised money to purchase a newspaper advertisement to 
make their discontent public (Delfino, 1997). Parents considered taking their cases to the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, accusing the Education Board of depriving their children of the right to learn in English. Some parents also 
protested outside the Education Board’s headquarters (Kwok, 1997). 
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trained to teach in Chinese. Others suggested that schools be allowed to choose the 
medium of instruction on a subject-by-subject basis.17 
 
• Interestingly, teachers were silent on the subject of the reform, mostly because their 
attention was diverted to the new benchmark test.18 
 
2.5 Government counter-reaction and implications 
Despite the public outcry, the SAR government did not back down. However, the government 
softened its position by accepting all 20 of the appeals launched.19 The government instituted four 
additional measures to assist the English schools in making the switch to Chinese. In addition, it 
made the DSS funding formula more attractive for aided schools.20, 21 
                                                 
17 Yau Ma Tei Kai Fong Association, a neighbourhood association, protested and won the right to offer informal classes 
in English for non-Chinese-speaking children who could not afford the tuition charged by international schools. 
18 The Professional Teachers’ Union resisted the LPAT through various collective actions, including the collection of the 
signatures of 37,000 language and non-language teachers, a public denunciation of the LPAT by over 1,000 teachers, 
press conferences and newspaper advertisements sponsored by teachers, and four public demonstrations (one of which 
was supported by six civil service associations). Despite the public outcry, the LPAT was eventually implemented (in 
2001). The first test, held in March 2001, attracted 413 English and 304 Putonghua candidates, of whom 30 percent were 
serving teachers and 70 percent were prospective graduates of the Hong King Institute of Education or non-serving 
teachers (Law, 2003). The overall pass rate for English teachers was 65 percent (Glenwright, 2005). 
19 Regarding LPAT, the government also softened its position by revising the timeline. The first LPAT was postponed to 
March 2001. In addition, teachers were given three choices: (1) pass the LPAT, (2) pass the training courses recognized 
by the government, or (3) apply for an exemption (which was previously unavailable). To be exempted, English teachers 
had to hold a relevant and recognized degree with “substantial components on the study of English and its use” and 
recognized initial teacher training “with specialization in English and supervised English-teaching practice.” The 
government estimated that about 3,500 (out of 14,500) English-language teachers could be exempted. The first round of 
applications for exemption came in 2001. The applications of fewer than 1,600 English teachers and some 500 
Putonghua teachers were successful. 
20 Under the new funding formula, the government raised the maximum tuition to 2.33 times the unit cost. In 2001–02 a 
DSS secondary school could charge as much as $68,000 per pupil annually, while a DSS primary school could charge 
$48,000. The government also required those DSS schools whose tuition exceeded $20,000 to set aside money for 
scholarships to support pupils from low-income families. 
21 The four measures were: 
1. Schools whose applications for admission dropped dramatically were granted an extension to admit pupils 
for the next academic year.  
2. The Secretary for Education and Manpower announced a package to help schools teach in Chinese. Schools 
switching from English to Chinese had priority for grants and extra funding. 
3. The government announced that English schools would be permitted to run a Chinese-language stream for 
pupils who had difficulty learning in English. 
4. The government changed the funding formula for schools under the DSS, making it more attractive for 
aided primary and secondary schools. 
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The policy reform had at least five implications. First, public and aided secondary schools 
became stratified into a small stream of English schools and a large group of Chinese schools; this 
stratification reversed the historic pattern. Second, the new DSS funding formula opened a channel 
for aided schools to reclaim their autonomy with respect to the curriculum and the language of 
instruction.22 Third, a number of aided schools that could not afford the switch to DSS opted into the 
“through-train” scheme. Under this scheme, the secondary school would form affiliations with and 
admit pupils directly from some primary schools within its school district — thus education services 
became bundled into a package across the primary and secondary levels. In this way, the secondary 
school could determine its enrolment. Fourth, the policy reform, together with its supplementary 
education initiatives, caused uncertainty and confusion among parents. As a result, parents shifted 
their preference from public and aided schools to private and international schools, which were 
better able to exert control over the quality of teachers and the school curriculum.23 Fifth, and most 
importantly, the impact of the reform cascaded over the entire education system, affecting primary 
schools most especially. Because admission to secondary schools was dependent on the primary 
school district, the reform had the effect of subtly placing primary schools at the centre of the 
language controversy.24 
 
III. The Model 
                                                 
22 Since 1999, at least 40 formerly aided schools had already switched to DSS funding. The decision to do so has had 
profound geographic implications: Revenues of DSS schools depend on both government subsidies (based on enrolment) 
and tuition. DSS schools located in high-income areas had no difficulty attracting enrolments; however, aided schools in 
public-housing areas could attract hardly any enrolments if they switched to DSS. 
23 In October 1999 Hong Kong Island School, a U.S.-oriented international school, reported its largest enrolment ever. 
Close to 2,500 pupils had registered for the 1999–2000 school year. The increase in demand for English schools led to a 
plan by the English School Foundation to build two new schools in order to accommodate increased enrolment by local 
children. 
24 Local newspapers reported that parents pushed their children at age three to take courses and acquire interview skills 
in order to increase their chances of grade 1 placement in a private school or a through-train primary school associated 
with an English secondary school (Sweeting, 2004, p. 544). Some parents admitted to the local press that, in order to 
enrol their children in a reputable primary school and progress to an English secondary school, they borrowed the home 
addresses of friends and relatives living in the relevant school district. 
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The 1997 policy reform gave rise to voluminous education studies focusing on the causal effect of 
mother-tongue teaching and pupils’ school performance. However, the spatial implication of the 
reform remains unclear. The focus of the empirical model is to assess the change in the hedonic 
house price for proximity to primary schools — the main gateway to English secondary schools — 
and estimate the marginal bid function for proximity. Details of the model are discussed below. 
 
3.1 The hedonic regression model 
The hedonic regression is motivated by the standard model of an intrametropolitan housing market 
(Case and Mayer, 1996). Assume that households are perfectly mobile and choose among a given set 
of locations belonging to different school districts. Each school district has a fixed supply of land 
and housing. Households derive utility from consuming housing, neighbourhood amenities and non-
housing goods as a composite. Further assume that housing and non-housing goods have an inelastic 
supply and that households have convex utility functions. Under these assumptions, we can express 
house prices as a function of household income, property and neighbourhood characteristics. 
For example, suppose there are K housing markets. For a given market, k, assume that the 
price of the i-th property,  , is a function of the property’s physical characteristics, , location 
, neighbourhood attribute  and distance (proximity) to the neighbourhood primary school, Zik. 
A general specification of  is given as follows: 
ikY
ikY
ikX
ikL ikN
 
( ) ( )θ;Z,N,L,XfYg ikikikikik = , (1) 
 
where θ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
There is no consensus on the best specification for f and g. Common specifications include at 
least three types: log-log, semi-log and a general case that is based on the Box-Cox transformation, 
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which includes as specific cases the log-log and semi-log forms based on the parameter λ .25 We 
initially estimated the hedonic model using the Box-Cox transformation. The result provided an 
estimate of 10.=λ , which was not significantly different from zero; therefore, we use the semi-log 
specification for the hedonic model. The specification is given as follows: 
 
( ) ikzikNikLikxikik uZNLXYlog ++++= θθθθ  (2) 
 
The term  is the residual, which is assumed to have a mean of zero and standard deviation iku σ . 
The model is estimated separately for two markets: Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, 
with K = 2 (Figure 1). 
 
3.2 The marginal bid function 
Assume that the spatial distribution of primary schools in each market is exogenous. The hedonic 
function and the bid function characterize the way in which distance to the school, , is allocated 
among households. In particular, estimates from the hedonic function can be used to compute the 
marginal bid for being closer to a primary school. The marginal bid  is the marginal willingness 
to pay for proximity and is defined as: 
kZ
iW
 
iiii
i
i
i eDBXBZBBZ
YW ++++=∂
∂= 3210
ˆ
, 
 
                                                 
25 Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988) find that certain versions of the Box-Cox model perform best, although the log 
and linear models perform well when the house price model is misspecified. Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) point out 
that the Box-Cox model may not be preferable when the objective is to obtain the best parameter estimates rather than 
the best-fit model. 
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where  is the distance measurement,  is the individual’s expenditure on commodities other 
than ,  is the predicted hedonic price and  is a set of demand shifters. The term  is the 
disturbance, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with . 
iZ
i Y
iX
Z iˆ iD ie
iku
 
IV. Data and Variables 
Data for estimating the model are drawn from four sources. First, transaction data were acquired 
from one of the largest local realtors in Hong Kong. The transaction data consisted of 7,000 sales 
randomly picked from Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, of which half took place in 
1996 and half in 2001. The two samples represented 6.9 and 16.4 percent of the total number of 
transactions in Hong Kong in 1996 and 2001, respectively. In 1996 the property market in Hong 
Kong was rising rapidly from the trough of a price cycle, with an average property price of $4,500 
per square foot. The market reached its peak in mid-1997 but dropped dramatically during the 
financial meltdown in October 1997. In 2001 the average price bottomed at around $2,200 per 
square foot (Figure 2). 
The transaction data provide information on price per square foot, street address and the 
physical characteristics of the property. Physical characteristics include age of the building, floor 
number and the estate to which the property belongs.26 Older buildings are expected to sell at a 
lower price; flats on upper floors will sell at a higher price. Units from a large estate might hav
ambivalent influence on sell price. On the one hand, prices might be higher because large estates are 
often constructed by reputable builders with higher standards of quality. On the other hand, a large-
scale development could mean a greater supply of near-identical units, a situation that depresses the 
e an 
sell price. The database also contains information on the property’s days on market. Properties with 
longer days on market tend to be associated with lower prices. 
                                                 
26 An estate is a large-scale private residential development. An example would be Mei Fu Sun Chun in the Kowloon 
Peninsula. This estate was developed between 1965 and 1978 in eight phases. It comprises 99 towers with 13,500 flats 
ranging in size from 600 to 1,800 square feet. 
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The second source of data is the map of the mass transit railway (MTR) system in Hong 
Kong. The MTR is the subway system. We use the map of the MTR stations to create location 
variabl
itude 
 
tained 
ses are recorded and 
geocod
low 
                                                
es for the model. To do so, we first geocode the properties’ street addresses against Hong 
Kong’s street network file provided by MapInfo StreetPro and then extract the latitude and long
coordinates of the 7,000 sales. For each transaction, we calculate the distance to the nearest MTR
station. This distance variable serves as a proxy for accessibility because the MTR is one of the 
major transportation networks in Hong Kong.27 For each property, we create another variable that 
measures the distance to Central, which is Hong Kong’s central business district (CBD). Both 
distance variables are expected to exert a negative influence on sell price. 
The third source of data is the online school database. Primary school information is ob
from the Web page of the Education and Manpower Bureau. School addres
ed in order to compute the distance between each transacted property and its nearest primary 
school. Ideally, one would simply use school district boundaries to match each property with its 
school district (Black, 1999; Bogart and Cromwell, 1997, 2000; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004). Two 
factors might render the use of school district boundaries ineffective. First, district boundaries fol
irregular blocks and can change year to year; for parents, distance to the nearest school tends to be a 
more stable and reliable check for primary school admission. Second, school districts cover a broad 
spatial scale; each district contains five bands of secondary schools.28 If the model uses only school 
districts to examine the hedonic price for a good school, the price premium for a band one school 
could be offset by the price discount for a band five school at the school district level. For these 
reasons, we focus our model on distance to the nearest school. 
 
27 Between 1996 and 2001 seven new MTR subway stations were developed, for a total of 43 stations. 
28 Technically, “school bands” refers to the quintiles of pupils’ academic performance (see section 2.2). In reality, 
residents of Hong Kong label and stigmatize secondary schools by the band of grade 6 pupils they consistently admit — 
for example, band one secondary schools refers to schools that consistently admit pupils in the top quintile. 
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The school data contain information on whether or not the primary school is linked to a 
secondary school, by either the through-train scheme or a feeder arrangement.29 If the primary 
school is linked to a secondary school, the language designation of the secondary school is obtained 
from that school’s Web page. A dummy variable is created to identify English secondary schools. 
Since English secondary schools are perceived as offering education of a better quality, one would 
expect a price premium for properties closer to primary schools that are linked to English secondary 
schools. Henceforth, we refer to primary schools that are linked to English secondary schools as 
EMI-linked primary schools. 
The final source of data is the census profiles for small town-planning units (STPUs). An 
STPU is the smallest geographic unit used by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department to 
release census information. Census information is obtained for 1996 and 2001 to create the demand 
shifters in the bid function. These variables include average age of household head, average 
household size and average household income. The variable that measures the average household 
food expenditure, a proxy for non-housing expenditure, is obtained from the 1996 and 2001 issues of 
the Consumer Expenditure publications. Key variables are summarized in Table 2. 
 
V. Estimating strategy 
5.1 Overall estimating issues 
The model has two objectives. The first is to estimate the marginal bid for each unit distance closer 
to a primary school. The second is to compare the marginal bid (a) between primary schools that are 
EMI-linked and those that are not; (b) among public, aided and private schools; and (c) before and 
after the 1997 policy reform. 
 To achieve the first objective, we follow the conventional approach and execute the model in 
two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the marginal price of being closer to a primary school, 
                                                 
29 Feeder schools are schools that comprise both a primary and a secondary section. 
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based on the usual hedonic regression model. In the second stage, we use the results from stage one 
to estimate the marginal bid function for proximity to primary schools.  
The formal contributions to hedonic price theory and estimating marginal bid function were 
generally attributed to Rosen (1974). Hedonic price theory suggests that the price of a property is an 
aggregate of the implicit price of individual attributes bundled in the property. Using the implicit 
prices of individual attributes, Rosen analyzed the estimation problem of consumers’ marginal bid 
and supplies’ supply for a particular attribute as a standard identification problem, which could be 
solved by simultaneous estimation methods such as two-stage least squares (2SLS). Applying 2SLS 
to the marginal bid (supply) function requires the assumption that consumer (supplier) characteristics 
are appropriate instruments for the endogenous variables in the marginal bid (supply) function. 
Rosen’s approach has a major shortcoming. Marginal prices constructed from stage one do 
not add new information, a requirement for identification in the second stage (Brown and Rosen, 
1982). Two most commonly adopted solutions are the use of a priori restrictions on functional form 
(Chattopadhyah, 1999) or the use of segmented markets (Brasington and Hite, 2005; Brasington, 
2000, 2003). In the present study, we follow the latter approach and provide a formal Chow test for 
testing structural differences in the market segments.30 
To achieve the second objective, we note that the 1997 policy reform can be seen as a natural 
experiment. This allows us to divide the 1996/2001 pooled sample into “control” and “treatment” 
groups. One can separate the houses into those that were sold in 1996, before the reform (control), 
and those that were sold in 2001, after the reform (treatment). One can separate the properties into 
those whose nearest primary schools are not and are linked to EMI secondary schools (control and 
treatment, respectively). One can separate the transactions into those whose nearest primary schools 
                                                 
30 Recent years have seen a surge in the use of functional-form restriction or market segmentation to identify the demand 
for environmental goods. See Brasington and Hite (2005), Chattopadhyay (1999), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Cohen 
and Coughlin (2008), for example.  
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are public or aided (control) and those whose nearest primary schools are private, DSS funded or 
ESF operated (treatment). Henceforth, “private schools” refers to all private, DSS and ESF schools. 
To identify the control and treatment groups, we create six dummy variables and multiply 
each of them into the straight-line distance (in 100 metres) between the transaction and its nearest 
primary school. The first dummy variable, year 2001, equals one if the flat was sold in 2001 and 
zero otherwise. The second dummy variable, EMI-linked, equals one if the flat’s nearest primary 
school is linked to an English secondary school and zero otherwise. The third dummy variable, 
private primary school, equals one if the nearest primary school is private and zero otherwise. The 
fourth, fifth and sixth dummy variables — the focus of the present study — are EMI-linked x year 
2001, private primary school x year 2001 and private primary school x EMI-linked x year 2001. 
These dummy variables are multiplied into the variable that measures distance to the nearest primary 
school; the variables allow us to compare the marginal market price and the bid for proximity to 
private and EMI-linked schools, before and after the policy reform. 
To identify the impact of the policy reform, we include in the hedonic model the structural 
characteristics of the apartment, neighbourhood attributes and estate fixed effects, distance to the 
CBD, and nearest MTR station. Note that all distance variables are subtracted from an arbitrary 
constant of five kilometres such that the distance variables are interpreted as each 100 metres closer 
to the nearest primary school, the CBD or the nearest MTR station (Zabel and Kiel, 2000).31 
 
5.2 The hedonic model 
Estimation of the hedonic regression model involves two estimating issues. First, it is well known 
that days on market is endogenous — that is, transacted prices and days on market are jointly 
determined. To deal with this endogeneity issue, we estimate the hedonic model using 2SLS, with 
the season during which the property is sold as the instrument. 
                                                 
31 The results are robust to the choice of the arbitrary constant (Zabel and Kiel, 2000). 
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Second, to ensure that the principal influence of any change in property prices is captured by 
the variable that directly measures the policy innovation, we test the hedonic model using two 
alternative specifications. The first specifies separate hedonic models for the 1996 and 2001 samples. 
This alternative specification tests whether the estimates are consistent for other coefficients. The 
second alternative specification includes in the hedonic model the variable that captures the language 
of instruction of the nearest secondary school. Because primary schools are the principal channel 
determining pupils’ allocation to a secondary school, one expects that the hedonic estimates will be 
robust to including secondary school information. 
 
5.3 The marginal bid function 
The marginal bid for each 100 metres closer to a primary school can be estimated using the marginal 
prices from the estimated hedonic regression model. The marginal bid is regressed on distance to the 
nearest school (subtracted from the arbitrary constant of five kilometres), non-housing expenditure 
and demand shifters. The non-linearity of the hedonic function allows households to choose both 
distances and marginal prices for proximity — for example, households that place a greater value on 
education might choose to live closer to EMI-linked primary schools and bid higher for proximity. In 
this case, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the marginal bid function will be biased (Bartik, 
1986, 1987). 
To consistently estimate the marginal bid function, we use a 2SLS approach, using the 
district dummy for Hong Kong Island (versus the Kowloon Peninsula) as the instrument. We assume 
that the district dummy exogenously shifts the household budget constraint but is uncorrelated with 
households’ valuing of education — that is, we assume that the hedonic function varies across 
districts and that average valuing of education do not.32 We add other instruments by multiplying the 
                                                 
32 We perform the Chow test to test whether the two districts, Hong Kong and Kowloon, can be pooled. The error sum of 
squares is 319.5584 for the separate Hong Kong hedonic model and 244.1322 for the Kowloon model. The pooled model 
has an error sum of squares of 575.6480. Altogether, there are k=45 parameters, with a total sample size of n1+n2=7,000. 
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district dummy with the demand shifters, including household size, household size squared, 
household age and household age squared. 
For the demand shifters, ideally one would obtain variables at the household (consumer) 
level; however, such information is unavailable for the present study. Instead, we create demand 
shifters using areal averages of the neighbourhood (STPU) in which the transaction is located. In 
doing so, we implicitly assume that the number of transactions in each STPU is small relative to the 
housing stock such that the transactions do change the spatial average of the demand variables in the 
STPU. Because the demand variables are spatial averages, we interpret the bid function as the 
willingness-to-pay function of the average resident in a neighbourhood. Estimates for the demand 
shifters will show the extent to which changing the average neighbourhood characteristics might 
shift (up or down) the bid function across STPUs. 
In sum, we first estimate a semi-log form of the hedonic regression model for house prices, 
by applying the 2SLS technique to account for the endogeneity of days on market. Using the results 
from the hedonic model, we calculate the marginal bid for each 100 metres closer to a primary 
school — public and aided, private, EMI-linked/not EMI-linked — by computing the marginal 
hedonic price. We then estimate a 2SLS model for the marginal bid function for proximity to various 
types of primary school. 
 
VI. Results 
Table 3 presents the estimated hedonic price model. Table 4 displays the estimated marginal bid by 
types of school. Table 5 summarizes the results of the bid function. 
 
6.1 Hedonic analysis 
                                                                                                                                                                   
The Chow test statistic is 3.2573, against the F-critical value of 1.5576 at the 1-percent significance level; therefore, the 
test result allows us to reject the null hypothesis of identical parameters in the two separate hedonic models for Hong 
Kong and Kowloon. 
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The preferred approach is the regression that uses the pooled sample, whose results are reported in 
Table 3, column (V). Standard errors are reported in parentheses; double asterisks identify estimates 
that are significant at the 5-percent level. The focus is on the variable distance to primary school and 
its interaction with the dummy variables EMI-linked primary school, private primary school, private 
EMI-linked primary school and year 2001. In column (V), the model controls for structural, 
neighbourhood and school characteristics but excludes secondary school information. It has an R 
squared of 0.58. 
The results show that, in 1996, apartments that are closer to primary schools, and particularly 
private primary schools, tend to sell higher than those that are further away. The coefficient of 
distance to primary school shows the implicit price for each 100 metres closer to a primary school in 
1996. It is positive and significant. For each 100 metres closer, the transacted price tends to rise by 
3.83 percent. Its interaction with the variable private primary school is also positive and significant. 
The estimate shows that the apartment would sell higher at a premium of 4.08 (= 3.83 + 0.25) 
percent for each 100 metres closer to a private primary school. 
The 2001 implicit value of proximity to any primary school is not significantly different from 
the 1996 value; however, the 2001 implicit value of proximity to a private primary school is higher 
than the 1996 value. This result is shown by the fact that the variable distance to primary school x 
year 2001 is insignificant and that private primary school x year 2001 is positive and significant (at 
the 10-percent level). For each 100 metres closer to a private primary school, the premium is an 
additional 0.02 percent in 2001 compared to transactions made in 1996. 
Apartments that are close to EMI-linked primary schools do not sell significantly higher in 
2001 than the average school in 1996; however, those that are near private EMI-linked primary 
schools do sell higher in 2001 than in 1996. This observation is supported by the result that EMI-
linked primary school is insignificant but that its interaction with year 2001 is positive and 
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significant. The additional premium for a private EMI-linked primary school is 0.14 percent of the 
transacted price in 2001, compared to a similar apartment sold in 1996. 
To lend context to the estimates, consider the average apartment in the pooled sample. The 
average sell price is $3,557.83 per square foot and the average size of an apartment is 711.79 square 
feet. The average apartment is 420 metres from a primary school. The total sell price of the 
apartment in 1996 is $2,532,410.03. If the apartment is 100 metres closer to its neighbourhood 
primary school, it will sell for an additional $96,991.30; if the primary school is linked to an EMI 
secondary school, the transaction will carry an additional premium of $795.72, with a sell price of 
$2,630,106.33. On the other hand, a private school would add a premium of $6,331.03; an EMI-
linked private school would further add $759.72, giving a total of $2,637,251.08. 
If the transaction occurs in 2001, the distance premium adds another $3,798.62 for each 100 
metres closer to a primary school; the 2001 transacted price becomes $2,633,199.95 (= 
$2,532,410.03 + $96,991.30 + $3,798.62). If the 2001 transaction is near an EMI-linked or a private 
primary school, the transacted price would be $506.48 higher. If the private school is also EMI-
linked, it will sell for $3,545.37 more than in 1996. In sum, an apartment would sell for $8,356.95 
more in 2001 than in 1996, for each 100 metres closer to a private EMI-linked primary school.33 
We check the robustness of the results by comparing the estimates with those under the 
alternative specifications (Table 3). Four notes follow. First, the model results are robust to the 
inclusion of secondary school information. In column (VI), we include in the model distance to the 
nearest secondary school and English secondary school, and the model estimates hardly change. 
Second, we estimate the model for the 1996 and 2001 sample separately; see columns (I) and (III). 
Estimates for primary school variables are consistent with those reported in column (V). Third, note 
that all other variables receive consistent estimates for the 1996 and 2001 samples (Appendix 2). 
                                                 
33 While a figure of $8,356.95 might seem immaterial in the context of an apartment worth $2 million, it should be kept 
in mind that the median monthly salary in Hong Kong is $8,000 to $9,000. Meanwhile, according to the Hong Kong 
Council of Social Services, for every 100 children under the age of 15, almost 25 live in families with earnings below the 
first quartile. 
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Finally, comparing the results in columns (I) and (III) with those in columns (II) and (IV), one finds 
that the inclusion of secondary school information in the separate 1996 and 2001 model does not 
affect the model estimates. 
We test the endogeneity of days on market using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). In essence, the DWH test is an augmented regression test 
because it first regresses days on market on all exogenous variables and then includes the first-stage 
error in the second-stage OLS regression. If the coefficient for the first-stage error is significant, then 
the OLS estimates in the second stage will be inconsistent. In the present study, we find that the p-
value for days on market is large (0.92); therefore, OLS estimates are consistent for the hedonic 
model. 
 
6.2 Marginal bid analysis 
We estimate a separate hedonic price function for each district (Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon 
Peninsula) using the pooled sample. We use the implicit marginal price of distance to the nearest 
primary school to compute the marginal bid for proximity to the school (Table 4). We then estimate 
the marginal bid function, with distance to school and non-housing expenditure being endogenous. 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the marginal bid function using 2SLS techniques. The R-squared 
ranges from 0.26 for the entire pooled sample to 0.29 for the sample of EMI-linked primary schools 
and 0.27 for private schools. R-square is highest (0.37) for private EMI-linked primary schools. 
The results show that households spending more on non-housing items tend to bid less for 
proximity to public or aided primary schools and more for proximity to private schools. Households 
with higher incomes also bid higher for proximity to private primary schools. While larger 
households tend to bid more for public or aided schools, smaller households bid more for private 
schools. Similarly, older households bid more for public or aided primary schools. 
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 The variable year 2001 (interacted with distance to primary school) is insignificant for the 
bid function for primary schools in general but positive and significant for private schools. Its 
magnitude is greatest for the subsample of private EMI-linked schools. These results provide 
evidence supporting our hypothesis: In 2001 households seem to have shifted away from public 
education and to bid more for private schools, especially those that are linked to EMI secondary 
schools. 
Critics might initially suspect that the marginal bid for proximity to EMI-linked primary 
schools should be similar before and after the 1997 reform, for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
talk about the 1997 language reform began in the early 1990s. The reform did not happen overnight. 
At the same time, the 100 English secondary schools have long been recognized as the top, elite 
schools by the public; the policy reform could not be an innovation that shocked the market. Instead, 
it could be considered as a relabeling exercise of the existing level of school quality. In both cases, 
concerned parents could have already moved to a better school district prior to the policy 
announcement in 1997. 
We offer two reasons that might explain the significant difference between the pre- and post-
reform marginal bid. First, despite the fact that discussion of the policy reform occurred in the early 
1990s, media coverage had been negligible. Both parents and the schools remained uninformed 
(Sweeting, 2004). It was not until 1997 that the policy reform was firmly executed that parents 
started to react to the new language policy. 
Second, note that those households who tend to bid higher for EMI-linked primary schools 
and private schools are smaller, younger and wealthier. They tend to be less experienced parents, 
who are actively acquiring information about the education system. Larger households with more 
children might have already moved to the desirable school district when making their school 
decisions for the first-born.  
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How well does the district dummy serve as the instrument for distance to primary school? In 
terms of relevance, the district dummy contains only two levels; therefore, the correlation coefficient 
between district and distance is meaningless due to the small number of variations in the district 
dummy. Nonetheless, our results show that the district dummy is significant at the 5-percent level in 
the first stage of estimating the bid function (the coefficient estimate is -0.19 with a p-value of 
0.01).34 In terms of exogeneity, the instrument passes the over-identification test. The Sargan test, 
whose null hypothesis stipulates that the instrument is exogenous, reveals a test statistic of 25.9 for 
the overall sample, 26.78 for the subsample of EMI-linked primary schools, 25.38 for private 
schools and 23.29 for private EMI-linked primary schools; the test statistic is distributed as with 
26 degrees of freedom; the p-values are 0.47, 0.42, 0.50 and 0.62 correspondingly. In all cases, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that the instrument is exogenous.
2χ
35 
 
VII. Conclusions 
The present study assesses the spatial impact of the 1997 education policy reform in Hong Kong. It 
estimates a hedonic model of transacted prices and the marginal bid function for proximity to 
primary schools. The results provide evidence supporting our hypothesis: The 1997 policy reform 
might have increased the demand for private education, especially private primary schools linked to 
                                                 
34 Results are available upon request. 
35 One might question whether spatial lag and/or spatial error could serve as alternative model specifications (Brasington 
and Hite, 2005; Cohen and Couglin, 2008). In terms of the spatial lag model, one has to be mindful that its conceptual 
underpinning is the substitutability of neighbouring dwelling units. In the case of Hong Kong, an extremely densely 
populated city, one can argue conceptually it is unlikely that such underpinning could hold because of the frequent 
demolition and reconstruction of apartment buildings in both old and new districts. For example, a simple 500-meter 
walk on the Hong Kong island — a small block in most North American cities — could already canvass more than 20 
tall and skinny apartment buildings, whose age ranges between less than 5 to more than 30 years. For this reason, the 
applicability of a spatial lag model becomes questionable; instead, estate fixed effects could be more prominent in 
influencing property prices. Technically, this point is confirmed by conducting an LM test for spatial lag for the two 
districts separately. The spatial lag variable is the average selling price per square foot of preceding transactions within a 
300-meter cutoff. The test statistic is distributed as ) , with a critical value of 6.635 at the 1-percent significance level. 
The resulting test statistics are.2.1311 and 3,0021 for the Hong Kong and Kowloon model, respectively. Both test 
statistics suggest a failure to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of spatial dependence. In terms of spatial error, the 
Moran’s I test statistics are 1.2202 and 1.0131 for the hedonic (pooled) and marginal bid functions, respectively. Both 
test results suggest a failure to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of spatially autocorrelated errors. 
1(2χ
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English secondary schools. The results show that the marginal bid for proximity to private English 
schools increased by 2 percent after the reform. On average, homeowners are willing to pay HK 
$8,400 for each additional 100 metres closer to a private EMI-linked primary school.  
The study reveals that school districts have demarcated the housing market of Hong Kong 
into distinctive submarkets and that the 1997 language reform represented a local change within each 
submarket. In order for the policy innovation to exert an influence on transacted house prices, the 
labelling effect of English schools could not possibly spillover to other school districts; instead, the 
effect must be contained within the local district. In an otherwise closed submarket in which the 
labelling effect could be felt across submarkets, the capitalization of being close to an English school 
could not have taken place. 
The study draws implications for policy-makers: Education policies that are aspatial often 
have a spatial effect on welfare. The fact that a majority of the 100 English secondary schools are 
located on Hong Kong Island implies that increases in the bid for proximity to EMI-linked primary 
schools facilitate a redistribution of housing wealth to Hong Kong Islanders at the expense of 
residents of the Kowloon Peninsula — let alone residents of the New Territories. This spatial effect 
on welfare merits further research attention and requires more detailed socioeconomic data at finer 
geographic scales, if not at the home-buyer level. 
The increased marginal bid for English education in 2001 reveals that, while the provision of 
vernacular education might be political, the demand for English education remains the preferred 
economic choice for children. This strong demand for English education is not surprising, in light of 
Hong Kong’s role in the global financial market, an international appearance that requires workers to 
be proficient in English in order to stay competitive. The compulsory switch to vernacular education 
might eventually act as an incentive for wealthier parents to seek alternatives by either sending their 
children or moving the whole family to overseas for the pursuit of English education.  
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As an epilogue, the 1997 policy reform represents a failure despite the government’s own 
applause. In 2005 the SAR government conducted an interim review of the policy reform. The 
review assessed the performance of secondary 5 (grade 11) pupils on the Hong Kong Certificate of 
Education Examination (HKCEE), a public examination to determine pupils’ entrance to 
matriculation and, in some cases, pre-admission to university. Pupils sitting for the 2005 HKCEE 
were the first cohort of graduates after the fully implemented policy reform. The government review 
found that most pupils from vernacular schools performed slightly better in non-language subjects 
than those who wrote the 2002 HKCEE, the last cohort of secondary pupils admitted prior to the 
1997 reform. Pupils from Chinese secondary schools performed more poorly in the English course 
specifically (Education Commission, 2005). The results stirred public reaction concerning the 
comparability of the 2002 and 2005 test questions and the scientific basis of the review. More 
importantly, Hong Kong’s postsecondary education was conducted mostly in English; educators 
found a general decrease in language proficiency among even the top vernacular secondary schools. 
Eventually, in April 2009, the government “fine tuned” the language policy and reverted back to the 
pre-reform arrangement: Secondary schools could use their discretion in choosing the medium of 
instruction in order to maintain the integrity and coherence of the curriculum. 
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Table 1 Number of schools by source of funding, 1994 and 2001 
  Number of institutions
Percentage of 
enrolments 
  1994 2001 1994 2001 
Primary school      
     Public and aided 790 714 88.57 89.92 
     Private and DSS 64 63 8.82 6.97 
     International and ESF 30 38 2.62 3.11 
Total 884 815 100 100 
Secondary school      
     Public and aided 366 404 87.08 90.31 
     Private and DSS 99 69 10.99 7.36 
     International and ESF 23 23 1.93 2.33 
Total 488 496 100 100 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2005. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics (selected variables) 
 
  
1996 sample (n = 
3,500) 
2001 sample (n = 
3,500) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Transacted price per sq. ft. (2001 HK dollars) 4,261.96 1,659.28 2,853.70 1,711.73 
Distance to nearest primary school (100 metres) 3.63 3.08 2.79 2.17 
Percent transactions near EMI-linked primary school 24.33 42.85 25.06 43.34 
Percent transactions near private primary school 27.06 44.43 24.80 43.19 
Distance to nearest secondary school (100 metres) 2.93 3.23 2.82 2.40 
Percent transactions near EMI secondary school 28.86 45.33 30.03 45.84 
Notes: Price data are acquired from one of the largest local realtors in Hong Kong. School data are obtained 
from individual school Web sites. All addresses are geocoded against the street network file acquired from 
MapInfo. Calculations by the authors. 
 
 
 32
 33
Table 3 Selected hedonic regression model estimates, by 2SLS 
  (I)   (II)  (III)   (IV)  (V)   (VI)   
Variables  1996 sample     2001 sample   Pooled sample   
Distance to neighbourhood school             
Primary school 0.0322 ** 0.0287 ** 0.0282 ** 0.0236 ** 0.0383 ** 0.0379 **
  (0.0030)  (0.0041)   (0.0040)  (0.0050)   (0.0032)  (0.0044)  
EMI-linked primary school 0.0007 * 0.0007 * 0.0002  0.0003   0.0003  0.0004  
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Private primary school 0.0024 ** 0.0024 ** 0.0026 ** 0.0027 ** 0.0025 ** 0.0025 **
  (0.0003)  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Private EMI-linked primary school 0.0001  0.0001   0.0017 ** 0.0018 ** 0.0003  0.0003  
  (0.0006)  (0.0006)   (0.0007)  (0.0007)   (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
Primary school x year 2001           0.0015  0.0058  
            (0.0047)  (0.0062)  
EMI-linked primary x year 2001           0.0002  0.0000  
            (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
Private primary school x year 2001           0.0002 * 0.0003 * 
            (0.0001)  (0.0002)  
Private EMI-linked primary school x year 2001           0.0014 ** 0.0014 **
            (0.0006)  (0.0006)  
Other control variables               
Structural characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Housing estate fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Percent government housing in neighbourhood Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Distance to CBD Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Distance to MTR Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Primary school characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Distance to nearest secondary school No  Yes  No  Yes   No  Yes  
Whether secondary school is EMI No  Yes  No  Yes   No  Yes  
                
R squared 0.52  0.52  0.45  0.45  0.58  0.58  
N 3,500   3,500  3,500   3,500  7,000   7,000   
Notes: Price data are acquired from one of the largest local realtors in Hong Kong. School data are obtained from individual school 
Web sites. All addresses are geocoded against the street network file acquired from MapInfo. The dependent variable is the log of the 
per-square-foot sell price of a flat. All distances are measured in 100 metres and are subtracted from an arbitrary constant of five 
kilometres; they are interpreted as each 100 metres closer to the nearest school, an MTR station or the CBD. Structural characteristics 
include age of the building and the floor number. The model includes days on market, which is endogenous and is instrumented by the 
season in which the flat is sold. Standard errors are in parentheses. Single asterisks identify significance at the 10-percent level, double 
asterisks at the 5-percent level. See the Appendix for the full model. Calculations by the authors. 
Table 4 Predicted marginal bid as a percentage of sell price, 1996 and 2001 
 
  1996 sample 2001 sample 
Predicted price per sq. ft. 4,138.56 2,715.85 
Marginal bids (% of predicted price)   
Primary school 2.96 2.11 
EMI-linked primary school 3.03 2.13 
Private primary school 2.35 3.15 
Private EMI-linked primary school 1.62 3.26 
Note: Predictions are based on the 2SLS results in Table 2, evaluated at the 
pooled sample means. 
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Table 5 Estimated marginal bid function, by school type 
  Primary school   
EMI-linked 
primary 
school   
Private primary 
school   
Private EMI-
linked primary 
school   
Distance to primary school -0.04 **       
  (0.01)        
Distance to EMI-linked 
primary school   -0.01 **     
    (0.00)      
Distance to private primary 
school     -0.06 **   
      (0.00)    
Distance to private EMI-linked 
primary school       -0.04 **
        (0.02)  
Ln (average non-housing 
expenditure) -2.18 ** -2.26 * 5.58 * 3.66 **
  (0.38)  (8.28)  (6.11)  (1.29)  
Ln (average household 
income) 0.02  0.09  0.29 ** 0.25 **
  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.04)  
Average household size 1.84 ** 0.76  -0.39 ** -0.23 **
  (0.21)  (6.02)  (0.05)  (0.09)  
(Average household size)2 -0.02  -0.20  0.04 ** 0.03  
  (0.03)  (0.73)  (0.01)  (0.10)  
Average age of household 
head -0.82 ** -0.60 ** 0.31  0.35  
  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.62)  
(Average age of household 
head)2 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.00 ** -0.01  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Average household size x year 
2001 -1.05 ** -0.63 ** -0.20  -0.60  
  (0.07)  (0.24)  (0.15)  (0.44)  
(Average household size)2 x 
year 2001 0.03  0.21  0.02  0.05  
  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.03)  
Average age of household 
head x year 2001 0.71  -0.17  -0.60  -0.05  
  (0.37)  (0.15)  (0.33)  (0.12)  
(Average age of household 
head)2 x year 2001 0.13  0.09 ** 0.04  -0.04  
  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.09)  
Year 2001 -2.24 * 0.03  0.28 ** 2.11 **
  (1.22)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (1.04)  
Intercept 2.76  0.99  1.01  2.82  
  (2.79)  (0.86)  (5.55)  (1.61)  
          
R squared 0.26  0.29  0.27  0.37  
N 7,000   1,725   1,815   812   
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the marginal bid for each 100 metres closer to the nearest primary 
school. Distance to school and non-housing expenditures are endogenous; they are instrumented by the district 
dummy and its interaction with the demand shifters. Variables for the demand shifters are obtained from the 
census profiles of STPUs and are spatial averages. Standard errors are in parentheses. Single asterisks identify 
significance at the 10-percent level, double asterisks at the 5-percent level. Calculations by the authors. 
Figure 1 The study area  
 
 
Notes: Boundary files provided by MapInfo. The remaining areas form the New 
Territories in Hong Kong. Each black dot represents a primary school and a 
circled dot represents an EMI-linked primary school. Map prepared by the authors. 
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Figure 2 Hong Kong house price index, 1995–2008 
 
 
Source: Midland Realty Hong Kong, 2009 
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Appendix 1 Secondary school allocation in Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong government provides children with nine years of free, compulsory 
education covering grades one to nine. Upon graduation from primary 6 (grade 6), pupils 
were allocated to public or aided secondary schools for another three years of compulsory 
education, through either discretionary placement or central allocation. Neither allocation 
scheme applies to pupils seeking private secondary education. 
Less than 13 percent of all grade 6 pupils were allocated by discretionary 
placement successfully. Under the discretionary placement scheme, public and aided 
secondary schools were given an annual quota — 10 percent of total admissions — for 
accepting grade 6 pupils based on schools’ discretionary assessment criteria.36, 37 Grade 6 
pupils could apply to any discretionary placement regardless of the school district. 
Close to 85 percent of all grade 6 pupils were allocated to secondary schools 
through the central allocation scheme. In accordance with this scheme, allocation was 
determined by five elements: the school district in which the primary school was located, 
the parental choice of secondary school, three internal assessments of the pupil’s school 
performance, the primary school’s overall performance on a public aptitude test, and a 
computer-generated random number for each pupil. 
A key element of the central allocation system was the school district in which the 
primary school was located. The school district defined the types and quality of 
secondary schools available for parents to choose from. Each year, parents of grade 6 
pupils were given a list of secondary schools within the school district and were asked to 
rank them. 
 
36 In 2001 the quota was changed from 10 percent to 20 percent. 
37 Prior to 2001, secondary schools could use both written tests and interviews to assess pupils applying for 
discretionary placement. As of 2001, only interviews were allowed. 
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The quality of primary schools was critical to determining secondary-school 
allocation, because the overall school performance would be used to rescale any 
individual pupil’s assessment score. Each pupil was assessed internally three times: at the 
end of grade 5, mid-year in grade 6 and at the end of grade 6. Pupils would then be 
ranked within their own school, based on the results of the internal assessment. 
Meanwhile all participating grade 6 pupils would write a public aptitude test.38 The 
overall performance of all pupils in a school in this test would be used to rank all 
participating primary schools in Hong Kong; the school ranking formed the basis for 
rescaling the individual pupil’s internal assessment results. In this way, all grade 6 pupils 
would be divided into five groups, adjusted by the school’s overall relative standing. 
Each group, or band, would comprise 20 percent of all pupils within a school district, 
with band one pupils scoring in the top 20th percentile of the rescaled internal 
assessments.39 Because of the critical role of primary schools in the rescaling process, 
parents were motivated to enrol their child in a quality primary school in order to secure a 
placement in an English secondary school. 
The rescaled assessment score, together with a computer-generated number, 
would determine pupils’ order of allocation. Band one pupils would be the first to choose 
their ideal school, followed by lower-band pupils. Pupils within the same band were seen 
as equal in terms of academic aptitude; therefore, to give pupils in the same band a fair 
chance at choosing their ideal school, each pupil would be given a random number to 
determine the order of allocation. 
 
 
 
38 The public aptitude test was abolished in 2001; the policy goal was to eventually use internal assessment 
results only. As a transition, in 2001 the scaling factor for schools was the average school performance in 
the aptitude test over the preceding three years. 
39 In 2001 the number of bands was reduced to three. The rationale for this policy change was that a smaller 
number of bands might lead to increased diversity within schools. 
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Appendix 2 Hedonic regression results, 1996 and 2001, by 2SLS 
Variables 1996 sample   2001 sample 
Primary school 0.0322 ** 0.0282 **
  (0.0030)  (0.0040)  
EMI-linked primary 0.0007 * 0.0002  
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Non-government-related primary school 0.0024 ** 0.0026 **
  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  
Non-government-related EMI-linked primary school 0.0001  0.0017 **
  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  
Days on market -0.0844 ** -0.0518 **
  (0.0068)  (0.0098)  
Age -0.0359 ** -0.0282 **
  (0.0023)  (0.0025)  
(Age)2 0.0004 ** 0.0002 **
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Floor 0.0050 ** 0.0074 **
  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  
8th Floor 0.0495 ** 0.0310 * 
  (0.0166)  (0.0193)  
4th Floor -0.0826 ** -0.0204  
  (0.0171)  (0.0189)  
Percent public housing in neighbourhood -1.0526 ** -1.0534 **
  (0.1449)  (0.0891)  
All-girls/All-boys primary school 0.0701 ** 0.0893 **
  (0.0196)  (0.0239)  
Whole-day primary school -0.0912 ** -0.0880 **
  (0.0113)  (0.0134)  
Chi Fu Fa Yuen 0.0674  0.1528 **
  (0.0519)  (0.0663)  
Taikoo  0.4422 ** 0.2297 **
  (0.0327)  (0.0387)  
Laguna -0.2513 ** -0.1653 **
  (0.0379)  (0.0433)  
Whampoa Garden 0.2381 ** 0.0533 * 
  (0.0239)  (0.0303)  
Telford Garden 0.3240 ** 0.3966 **
  (0.0409)  (0.0550)  
Sceneway 0.1894 ** 0.0345  
  (0.0440)  (0.0502)  
Amoy Garden 0.1152 ** -0.0896 **
  (0.0360)  (0.0402)  
Parc Oasis 0.4530 ** 0.4139 **
  (0.0529)  (0.0662)  
Mei Foo Sun Chun -0.1340 ** -0.0587 * 
  (0.0302)  (0.0351)  
South Horizon -0.0992 ** -0.0147  
  (0.0351)  (0.0399)  
Heng Fa Chuen 0.0543  0.1584 **
  (0.0422)  (0.0508)  
Kornhill 0.5626 ** 0.2172 **
  (0.0442)  (0.0498)  
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Proximity to CBD  0.0056 * 0.0110 **
  (0.0028)  (0.0035)  
Proximity to nearest MTR station 0.0158 ** 0.0182 **
  (0.0042)  (0.0060)  
Intercept 8.3807 ** 7.9631 **
  (0.2028)  (0.2336)  
      
R squared 0.52  0.45  
N 3,500   3,500   
Notes: Price data are acquired from one of the largest local realtors in Hong Kong. 
School data are obtained from individual school Web sites. All addresses are geocoded 
against the street network file acquired from MapInfo. The dependent variable is the log 
of the per-square-foot sell price of a flat. All distances are measured in 100 metres and 
are subtracted from an arbitrary constant of five kilometres. They are interpreted as each 
100 metres closer to the nearest school, an MTR station or the CBD. Days on market is 
endogenous and is instrumented by the season in which the flat is sold. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. Single asterisks identify significance at the 10-percent level, double 
asterisks at the 5-percent level. Calculations by the authors. 
 
